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Executive Summary  
 
This document presents the first draft version of the AARC Blueprint Architecture. This first              
version of the blueprint architecture provides a reference architecture to ​help e-infrastructure            
operators and technical architects in various research communities to design secure, scalable,            
user-friendly, and interoperable AAIs​ .  
 
The document has been circulated for comments among several research and e-infrastructures            
(such as Elixir, Dariah or CERN) that are potential implementers of the proposed architecture.              
The updated version of the document, which includes the received inputs, was published as the               
milestone document MJRA1.4 , due at the end of July 2016. Any feedback to this document will                1
help AARC shape the next versions of the AARC Blueprint Architecture. 
 
The content of this document was driven by the user communities and e-infrastructure​s             
requirements​ identified by the AARC architecture team,​ and it addresses the challenges that             
inhibit a wide adoption of federated access for eScience.  
 
The document is organised as follows: Section 2 will present the general architectural             
landscape as it appears to date. This leads to proposing a general Blueprint Architecture, which               
will be detailed in Section 3. 
 
In Section 4 we discuss the proposed architecture and analyse how it can match the identified                
requirements . Two appendices are provided that summarize the collected requirements (A) and            2
the set of AAI Architectures analysed (B).  
 
1 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/MJRA1.4-First-Draft-of-the-Blueprint-Architecture.pdf  
2 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AARC-DJRA1.1.pdf  
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 The acronyms used are those defined in the AARC document in Terms and Definitions  3
1. Introduction 
This document presents the first draft version of the AARC Blueprint Architecture. Since the              
publication of the draft version in may 2016, the team has been presenting it and gathering                
feedback, to present it to the e-infrastructures, research infrastructures, and research           
collaborations to solicit feedback on the proposed approach. Any feedback to this document will              
be taken into account in shaping the next versions of the AARC Blueprint Architecture. 
 
The document targets the technical architects and implementers of IT infrastructures for            
international research collaboration. The goal of the document is to provide a general blueprint              
AAI architecture that can be used as a reference for the design and implementation of               
integrated and interoperable AAI solutions in the R&E sector.  
 
In the last five years, eduGAIN has grown to become a global network of R&E identity                
federations around the world, simplifying access to content and resources for the international             
R&E communities. eduGAIN, by enabling the trustworthy exchange of information related to            
identity, authentication, and authorization (AAI) at a global scale, is a solid foundation for              
federated access in R&E. AAI architects and implementers can build advanced, tailored            
technical solutions on top of eduGAIN that meet the requirements of their research             
communities. Although one solution cannot fit all, by defining and adopting common best             
practices, architectural patterns and interfaces, we can build AAIs that are interoperable and             
which can be integrated in a wider ecosystem of e-Infrastructures and services for R&E.  
 
In the last year, the AARC project has been working together with e-Infrastructures, research              
infrastructures, research communities, AAI architects and implementers in order to collectively           
define a set of architectural building blocks and implementation patterns that will allow the              
development of interoperable technical solutions for international intra- and inter-disciplinary          
research collaborations. The goal of AARC is to provide guidelines and building blocks to              
support the development of interoperable AAIs. The proposed blueprint architecture aims to            
offer a framework compatible with existing solutions and which would ensure           
cross-implementation compatibility and interoperability. 
 
Between May and September 2015, we engaged in a discussion with scientific communities,             
infrastructure and service providers through a series of questionnaires and interviews, in order             
to capture their use cases, requirements, and existing technical solutions. The requirements            
captured by the TERENA AAA Study and the FIM4R paper were revisited and updated in light                4 5
of the new findings and published as an analysis document . This work was complemented by a                6
parallel activity in which we conducted a “market research” for existing software solutions that              7
are used today in the implementation of AAI solutions in the wider R&E sector. 
3 ​https://docs.google.com/document/d/18AllfUKLi90f1odm6hINkQvRljbFhy9lfkY1M447uBQ  
4 ​https://www.terena.org/publications/files/2012-AAA-Study-report-final.pdf  
5 ​https://cds.cern.ch/record/1442597/files/CERN-OPEN-2012-006.pdf?version=2  
6 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AARC-DJRA1.1.pdf  
7 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MJRA1.1-Existing-AAI-and-available-technologies.pdf  
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 2 AAI landscape for global research collaboration 
Federated access is fundamental for the international research collaboration. Researchers need           
to be able to access services, share data, and collaborate with the members of their scientific                
communities. Emerging research infrastructures (RI) comprise facilities such as computational          
clusters, storage, information systems; they are typically governed by community-specific          
policies that regulate access and publication. RIs typically provide services that are specifically             
tailored to the specific scientific disciplines. As a result, most of the RIs implement specific               
access policies for their scientific communities.  
 
The way researchers collaborate within scientific communities can vary significantly from           
community to community. On the one hand, there are highly structured communities with             
thousands of researchers who can be virtually anywhere in the world. Typically, these             
communities have been working together for a long time. They want to share and have access                
to a wide range of resources, and they have had to put in place practical solutions to make the                   
collaborations work. On the other hand, one finds a diverse number of smaller research              
communities working within specific or across scientific disciplines. Typically, these are either            
nascent communities being established around new scientific domains, or they are communities            
in specific domains that did not have to promote widespread and close collaboration among the               
researchers. And of course, in between these two extremes, there are many scientific             
communities of varying size, structure, history etc. 
 
The growing number of researchers and services with advanced requirements such as            
community based authorization, support for credential delegation, attribute aggregation from          
multiple sources, requires additional functional components on top of eduGAIN. This is the             
conclusion of the Analysis of user- community requirements  deliverable (DJRA1.1 ).  8
 
Based on the analysis of the existing and developing AAIs, outlined in Appendix B, similar               
approaches that target these additional functional components were identified. 
2.1 How research communities can use eduGAIN today 
Research communities and e-infrastructures can already rely on eduGAIN and the underlying            
identity federations to authenticate their users.  
 
The picture below (Figure 1 ) depicts the standard approach in which different services become              9
available via eduGAIN through a participating federation (it is not relevant whether a federations              
is implemented as ‘full-mesh’ or as ‘hub-and-spoke ;’). 10
 
8 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AARC-DJRA1.1.pdf 
9 ​http://services.geant.net/edugain/About_eduGAIN/Pages/Home.aspx 
10 ​https://wiki.edugain.org/Federation_Architecture 
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Figure 1: SAML interfederation, as provided (for       
example) by eduGAIN - Top part (almond color)        
shows the example of the “full mesh federation”,        
while the lower part (green, blue, and gray)        
shows the “hub-and-spoke” federation 
Figure 2: Examples of a research community       
and an e-Infrastructure in eduGAIN 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts two separate cases of research communities, which use eduGAIN for providing              
federated access to their services. In left of the lower half of the diagram two service providers,                 
belonging to the same research community, are depicted. This research community has set up              
their own SPs inside different federations, so that federated members can log in.  
Setting up a new SP into which all users of a community can login, is however, generally                 
perceived to be a complex and time consuming task. E.g. the coordination with federation and               
identity provider operators in order to permit the release of the necessary attributes is time               
consuming process with very slow results. This is due to various reasons, such as differences in                
national privacy laws, attribute release policies and the diverse representations of users            
delivered by different IdPs. 
 
The second scenario presented on the right side of figure 2 represents a research or               
e-Infrastructure, which is connected to eduGAIN via a single SP, acting like an SP-IdP proxy.               
The SP-IdP proxy component augments the authenticator and attributes that come from the             
'conventional R&E IdPs' with elements that are essential for the infrastructure or research             
community: a persistent non-reassigned identifier, assurance level, maybe add community          
membership roles and groups, maybe add reputation. In that, the RIs shield themselves from              
the heterogeneity of the global R&E federation space, and they make it easier for themselves               
since they can now 'hide' all their services behind just a single proxy.. 
3 A Blueprint Architecture 
The existing federated AAI infrastructure is presented in Figure 3. The diagram illustrates the              
existing workflows and visualises flows between the components. The level of detail is             
intentionally low so that all relevant components can be included. 
4 
  
This diagram (figure 3) defines four layers, namely: ​User Identities, Attribute Enrichment,            
Translation, ​and End Services​. Each layer contains one or more components. The diagram             
does not strictly depict deployment scenarios. SPs are likely situated in a different             
organisational domain and nation than other services or users. Identities are possibly provided             
by services different from those that provide attributes.  
 
In order to keep the architectural drawing simple and clear, the diagram intentionally excludes              
user-workflows (especially details of redirections) and required ​trust models since they are            
out of scope in this document. 
 
Figure 3 - General schematic of the existing federated AAI infrastructures, with the main components               
placed into four layers: User Identities, Attribute Enrichment, Translation, and End Services. Arrows             
indicate the logical flow of information, not the workflow a user follows to access resources. Each                
resource (e.g. SP, IdP, AA, User) is federated in the sense that it is likely located inside a different                   
organisational domain than other resources it interacts with. 
 
The diagrams in Appendix B show the information flows of the analysed architectures by              
highlighting the respective components. The analysis of these architectures served as input for             
this blueprint architecture.  
 
In the next paragraphs we describe the functional building blocks of the blueprint architectures,              
to serve as an overview and to allow the identification of functional building blocks and their                
interplay. 
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The ​User Identities Layer ​contains services for identification and authentication of users.            
Usually in existing implementations in the R&E space, we find SAML (Security Assertion             11
Markup Language) Identity Providers, Certification Authorities and recently OIDC (OpenID          12
Connect) Providers (OP). Although the main focus of the services in this layer is to provide user                 
authentication, often, certain end user profile information is released as part of the             
authentication process. 
 
The ​Attribute Enrichment Layer groups services related to managing and providing           
information (attributes) about users. Typically, they provide additional information about the           
users, such as group memberships and community roles, on top of the information that might be                
provided by services from the User Identities Layer. Services like these exist for all the               
mentioned authentication technologies. Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) are         
commonly used in X.509 based infrastructures, Attribute Authorities (AAs) in SAML-based           
implementations, and the “userinfo”-endpoint in OpenID-Connect implementations. In this         
document we will use SAML AA terminology.  
 
The ​Translation Layer addresses the requirement for supporting multiple authentication          
technologies. Most often, we encountered two types of services: 
 
● Token Translation Services translate identity tokens between different technologies.         
Token translation can be implemented as a central service or offered at an SPs site. 
● SP-IdP-Proxy (proxy​) ​is an emerging pattern within research and e-infrastructures. This           
model is depicted in figure 2. It is predominantly found in SAML installations. Towards              
the Identity Federations this proxy looks like any other SP, while towards the internal              
SPs it acts as an IdP. 
 
The ​End Services Layer contains the services users actually want to use. The access to these                
services are AAI-protected (different technologies are used to protect the access). They range             
from simple web services, such as wikis or portals for accessing computing and storage              
resources, to non-web resources like a login shell, an FTP transfer- or a workload management               
system.  
 
 
3.1 Typical existing workflow 
Fig. 3 shows the general AAI landscape. To illustrate a basic workflow. it is included here again. 
11http://xml.coverpages.org/saml.html  
12https://openid.net/connect/  
6 
  
 
The general workflow for access to resources can be summarized: 
Ste Technolog Description 
1 SAML 
OIDC 
The user tries to access a resource and is redirected to an identity provider,              
typically via an identity provider discovery procedure. 
X.509 The user obtains a long-lived (10 days-2 years) certificate at a CA. 
2 SAML The user authenticates himself at the identity provider. The IdP creates a            
SAML response, which certifies his identity in the SAML-assertion and          
contains a set of IdP-defined attributes. The response is returned to the            
user. 
OIDC The user authenticates himself at the Open-ID provider. The OIDC service           
creates either an auth-code (pull model) or a JWT (push model). 
X.509 The user creates a proxy certificate and contacts an external Virtual           
Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) that certifies 3rd party attributes. 
3 SAML 
OIDC 
User is redirected back to initially contacted SP and presents the token to             
the SP. 
X.509 The user accesses the resource and authenticates either using the          
certificate retrieved in step 1 or the proxy certificate 
4 SAML 
OIDC 
The SP retrieves attributes from the token (push) and/or may use the            
retrieved token to retrieve additional attributes from one or more Attribute           
Authorities (pull). 
X.509 If a VOMS proxy certificate was used in step 3, then the SP extracts the               
user attributes from the proxy certificate 
5 All Based on attributes an authorisation decision is made.  
Access to resources is granted. 
7 
 3.2 Requirements covered & open challenges 
In this initial draft version of the AARC Blueprint Architecture, we have worked to address a                
subset of the requirements coming from the user communities and infrastructure providers. In             
the next versions of the document we will incrementally cover more of the identified              
requirements. Figure 4 lists the identified requirements. 
 
  
Figure 4 - Blue: These requirements are already being addressed.          
Blue-Green: Work on addressing these requirements has already started.         
Green: These requirements are going to be addressed in the next iterations            
of this document. 
 
Attribute Release 
The proposed architecture makes attribute release an easier case for the Identity Providers.             
IdPs do not have to deal with each and every service that is operated by the community. The                  
SP-IdP Proxy provides a single point of trust between the research community and the Identity               
Federations and IdPs. Asserting the compliance of the policies and operational practices is             
much easier if it is performed for one entity instead of having to assert the compliance and                 
establish trust with each individual community service. Furthermore, the proposed architecture           
allows the integration of community based and infrastructure operated Attribute Authorities,           
which can potentially provide many of the required user attributes. In such cases, the only thing                
that is required from the home IdPs is information that uniquely identifies the user in a                
consistent way. 
 
Attribute Aggregation 
Services require information that is available from multiple sources. Although the home            
organisation has information about the user’s identity, such as name, email, and affiliation,             
typically information about the user’s group membership(s) and role(s) within the research            
collaboration or research project is held by community services, which act as Attribute             
Authorities. Services need to be able to use both of these types of user attributes. With the                 
proposed architecture, attribute aggregation is provided by the SP-IdP Proxy so that services             
8 
 will not have to implement complex technical solutions for supporting multiples AAs.            
Furthermore, having the attribute aggregation performed centrally by the SP-IdP Proxy allows            
the implementation of central strategies for attribute mapping and harmonization so that the             
services receive a uniform set of attributes following well defined structure and semantics. 
 
Community based authorisation 
The integration of external AAs, along with the ability to aggregate attributes from multiple AAs,               
give the ability to the communities to manage group membership and user role information              
internally within their collaboration. These community based user attributes can be collected by             
the SP-IdP proxy, which creates the “composite” user identity, combining them with the             
attributes retrieved from the user’s home organisation. This “composite” user identity can then             
be made available to internal services in order to make the appropriate authorisation decisions.              
Still, there is a lot more work to be done in this area. With the current architecture, services can                   
make authorisation decisions based on the user’s identity. Future work will introduce the ability              
to manage centrally some or all of the authorisation policies, so that individual services will not                
have to deal with the implementation and maintenance of the authorisation policies. 
 
Persistent Unique Identifiers 
With the introduction of the SP-IdP proxy component, it is now possible for research              
communities to have one persistent, non-reassignable, non-targeted, unique identifier for each           
user even if such identifiers are not available from IdPs at the home organisations of the users.                 
The initial results of the investigation we conducted during the last year, have shown that the                13
most appropriate identifier in the eduPerson schema is the eduPersonUniqueId attribute.           14
Although this is an identifier that is not (yet) available from the home organisation IdPs, it meets                 
all of the identified requirements, and can be easily derived algorithmically based on the              
information available from the home organisations. Furthermore, the fact that this attribute can             
be scoped, is a very important characteristic for creating globally unique identifiers that can be               
used across infrastructures. There is still more work to be done on this subject, especially in the                 
area of cross-infrastructure/sector interoperability. Another aspect that we are already looking           
into is the privacy implications of such global identifiers and how can they be addressed at the                 
policy and technical levels. 
 
Guest Users 
One of the major goals of the AARC Blueprint Architecture is to also support those use cases in                  
which users in research collaborations do not have a federated identity via their home              
organisation. Moreover, there are cases in which an individual researcher is not affiliated with              
any of the traditional home organisations. To cater for these cases, the proposed architecture              
enables research communities and infrastructure providers to connect to Identity Providers that            
are not part of any of the eduGAIN participating federations. Such Identity Providers might be               
special purpose Identity Providers, designated specifically for these types of users, or they can              
13https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Requirements+Discussion+for+the+Blueprint+Architecture#Requireme
ntsDiscussionfortheBlueprintArchitecture-A.2 
14http://software.internet2.edu/eduperson/internet2-mace-dir-eduperson-201310.html#eduPersonUniqueId 
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 be general purpose Identity Providers such as governmental eID providers or social networks,             
which can act as the third party Identity Providers etc. The key factors in enabling such Guest                 
Identity services is to be able to support multiple technologies and flexible policies in a scalable                
and trustworthy manner. More information about the work on Guest Identities is available in the               
MJRA1.2 “Design for Deploying Solutions for “Guest Identities” . 15
 
Social & e-Gov IDs 
The support for social and e-Gov IDs relates a great deal with the previous requirement for                
“Guest Users”. The current architecture can support the use and mix of social IDs and e-Gov                
IDs together with identities coming from home organisations, which is partially useful for             
supporting the guest users. Another use cause that has been associated with the use of eGov                
IDs, is the support for higher levels of assurance and stronger authentication, which is also               
supported by the proposed architecture. Future work in this area will focus on the possibility of                
utilising e-Gov ID and social ID for specific use cases that require "step up authentication”,               
instead of using them as user’s primary identity.  
 
Levels of Assurance 
AARC has already delivered a baseline assurance framework (see MNA3.1 ) to enable a large              16
number of research use-cases in the infrastructures, as well as a set of differentiated assurance               
profiles permitting fine-grained control. However, additional assurance profiles are required to           
promote interoperation between infrastructures through harmonisation of LoAs or policy          
mappings between diverse LoAs. ​A framework for expressing LoA per attribute and per issuing              
party is missing at the present time, but is currently being investigated within AARC JRA1 and                
NA3 activities. 
 
Step up authentication 
Step up authentication will be covered in the next iterations of the AARC Blueprint Architecture 
 
User Friendliness 
A very important aspect of any solution is that it is user friendly and provides a good user                  
experience. Although this is typically a responsibility of the implementers, it is also important that               
the architecture support user friendly implementations. Along these lines, the support of features             
such as multi-protocol federated access that allows the integration of a wide range of identity               
providers, the support for both web based and non web based workflows, etc, have a clear                
impact in enabling the implementation of user friendly solutions. By working together with             
implementers and architects who have adopted the AARC Blueprint Architecture, we have            
already identified some difficulties that do affect the user experience. For example, redirecting             
the user from one WAYF page to another when one or more IdP-Proxies are involved in the                 
login workflow. Also, in a VO/research collaboration scenario, the user may need to explicitly              
select to log in through their collaboration IdP-Proxy rather than directly authenticating at their              
15https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/MJRA1.2-Design-for-Deploying-Solutions-for-Guest-Ide
ntities.pdf  
16 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/MNA31-Minimum-LoA-level.pdf 
10 
 Home IdP. This may be required, for instance, when the IdP-Proxy is needed to get VO/group                
membership/role information required for the authorisation purposes. ​In the upcoming iterations           
of the AARC Blueprint Architecture we will be introducing implementation best practices that can              
be utilised for addressing such issues. 
 
Credential Delegation 
The proposed architecture already supports credential delegation. In the case of SAML, this             
can be accomplished using the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) profile, however the required              
interaction flows are considered too complicated. At the same time, there is little (if any) support                
for the ECP profile in SAML implementations other than Shibboleth . Due to the limited client               17
support for the ECP profile, implementors should resort to using TTS or protocols like              
OIDC/OAuth2, which make simple delegation much easier. However, there are more advanced            
use cases where the "client" accessing the service is acting on behalf of another client that has                 
authenticated earlier. This form of multi-tier delegation is not fully covered by the current OAuth2               
specification. 
 
Non-web browser 
In the basic workflow for providing access to the resources (refer to Section 3.3), SAML and                
OIDC make use of HTTP redirects and thereby assume that the user is represented by a web                 
browser. However, the proposed architecture also caters for non-web-based federated access           
to resources, such as SSH, FTP, etc. Non-web access is also required for programmatic              
(REST-API) access to services. The underlying requirement here is to enable seamless access             
without modifying the services and clients that use it. Currently, this is usually achieved via the                
use of certificates that can be supported through Token Translation services. Alternatives are             
token-based approaches, which exist for selected OAuth flows and OIDC but not for SAML.              
While using TTS does provide non-web access for some use cases, end-to-end access to              
services that does not involve a web browser is still an open issue. Non-web resources usually                
require local, non-transient (or ephemeral) identities, such as operating system, database or            
service (e.g. iRODS) user accounts. Such identities typically require prior provisioning and            
deprovisioning once they are no longer used. During sign-on, the federated identity of the user               
must be mapped to a local one. At the same time, the federated attributes must be mapped to                  
local privileges which are typically translated to group membership or roles bindings. 
 
SP Friendliness 
The design of the proposed architecture has put significant focus on the friendliness towards              
service providers. In the proposed architecture, internal services need to trust only one single              
Identity Provider, the IdP subcomponent of the SP-IdP Proxy. Common technical services,            
which are typically required in federated access scenarios (such as Discovery Services, User             
Consent etc) should be provided centrally and should not have to be implemented by each               
service individually. Furthermore, the introduction of the IdP-Proxy attribute simplifies release,           
since connected SPs do not have to negotiate/agree on the release policy with each and every                
17 https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/CONCEPT/ECP 
11 
 identity provider operated by the communities. Instead, connected SPs only deal with a single              
entity, i.e. the IdP-Proxy, both on the technical and policy level. Furthermore, attribute             
aggregation is performed by the SP-IdP Proxy so that services will not have to implement               
complex technical solutions for supporting multiples AAs. As such, connected SPs receive            
consistent/harmonised user identifiers and accompanying attribute sets that can be interpreted           
in a uniform way for authorisation purposes. 
4 Summary 
This document presented a general blueprint AAI architecture that can serve as a reference for               
the design and implementation of integrated and interoperable AAI solutions in the R&E sector.              
The proposed blueprint architecture builds on the current AAI landscape and is driven by the               
user community and service provider requirements identified at the beginning of the AARC             
project. As such, it aims to be integrated and to interoperate with multiple existing AAIs and                
different technologies. The components that comprise the architecture can be grouped into four             
layers, namely User Identities, Attribute Enrichment, Translation, and End Services. The various            
interactions/interdependencies among these components are illustrated in a high-level         
architectural diagram. A general workflow for giving access to the resources based on the              
proposed approach is also provided. The proposed architecture already addresses a number of             
the requirements coming from the user communities and infrastructure providers. More of the             
remaining challenges will be incrementally covered in the next iterations of the blueprint             
architecture. An overview of the analysed AAI architectures and the identified user requirements             
is provided in the appendix. 
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 APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Requirements 
 
In its first year, the AARC project collected requirements from several scientific communities and 
project stakeholders. It is an outcome of the "Requirement Analysis" activity in the JRA1 work 
package, "Architecture for an integrated and interoperable AAI". The full report  is available as 18
a PDF, a summarised list of the requirements is available in the AARC wiki pages .  A technical 19
discussion of these requirements is also available in the AARC wiki pages . 20
Appendix B: Analysed Architectures 
All architecture diagrams were taken unmodified from the projects that developed them.            
Therefore, they expose different levels of detail. To identify the building blocks the following              
color coding is used: 
 
 
  
18 ​https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AARC-DJRA1.1.pdf  
19 ​https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Collected+Requirements  
20 ​https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Requirements+Discussion+for+the+Blueprint+Architecture  
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 B.1 EUDAT 
EUDAT2020 is a Horizon 2020 project building a “collaborative data infrastructure,” ​i.e. an             
infrastructure which offers data services to researchers. It offers services for replication            
(B2SAFE), sharing (B2SHARE), personal storage (B2DROP), moving to and from other           
infrastructures such as PRACE or EGI (B2STAGE), and more. The initial user communities             
were linguistics (CLARIN), climate (IS-ENES), Earth observation (EPOS), and human          
physiology (VPH), but the communities have since expanded beyond this. 
The EUDAT infrastructure is implementing an AAI solution called B2ACCESS. It serves as a              
central proxy component which bridges various AAI technologies used within the user            
communities (SAML/eduGAIN, OpenID Connect) to various technologies used by the service           
providers within the infrastructure. B2ACCESS also manages additional attributes for the users,            
some of which are provided by the home IdP, some are self-asserted by the user or allocated by                  
a group manager. The collected attributes are passed on (pushed) to the services in the created                
token or made available (pull): the token translation component creates the tokens required for              
accessing a specific service. Supported are X.509 (push), OAuth2/OIDC (pull), and SAML            
(push), as well as an API for account synchronisation with services (pull). 
  
14 
  
Figure 3.1 EUDAT components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by EUDAT, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.2 EUDAT Authentication flow mapped within the general AAI schematic 
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 B.2 DARIAH 
The Digital Research Infrastructure for the Arts and Humanities (DARIAH ) aims to facilitate             21
long-term access to, and use of, all European Arts and Humanities digital research data. It               
supports digital research, as well as the teaching of digital research methods. The DARIAH AAI               
is based on SAML. DARIAH provides an architecture to facilitate attribute aggregation at the SP               
without the need of a central proxy. They use an additional redirect to the DARIAH registration                
SP. This enables accepting users from IdPs that do not release enough attributes for an SP to                 
provide a service. All these attributes are stored in the DARIAH Attribute Authority (AA). 
 
  
21 https://dariah.eu/ 
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Figure 3.3 DARIAH components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by DARIAH, the color coding by AARC 
 
 
Figure 3.4 DARIAH Authentication flow, mapped within the general AAI 
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 B.3. ELIXIR 
ELIXIR is creating an infrastructure that integrates large amounts of biological data produced             22
by life science experiments across Europe. From a high-level functional point of view, the              
ELIXIR AAI is very similar to that of EUDAT. However, the used components are different ones.                
ELIXIR users can sign into the ELIXIR Proxy IdP using different authentication technologies             
(SAML2, OIDC, eGov, …) using existing authentication systems like eduGAIN or a social IDs              
(Google, LinkedIn, ORCID, ...). Every user gets an ELIXIR ID, which is then used as a persistent                 
identifier at ELIXIR services. The ELIXIR Proxy IdP collects attributes from external providers             
and from the ELIXIR Directory. It either authenticates the user towards a SAML SP or towards a                 
“Credential Translation” component. This allows support for the required authentication          
technologies on the service provider side. 
Notably, the ELIXIR Proxy IdP will support “Step-up-Authentication,” where authenticated users           
can be authenticated again, to improve the confidence an SP may have in their identity.               
Improving trust in the user’s identity can also be done by other methods (reputation, voting by                
existing members, account linking, …).  
For authorisation, in the life sciences, there are services (such as access to samples donated               
for research by patients) that require a researcher to present a research plan to a data access                 
committee. Dataset authorisation management is a service that facilitates that workflow. For            
less sensitive services, requiring only lightweight access control, there is a concept of “bona fide               
researcher” (a researcher in a good standing) that is enough to qualify him/her to access the                
service. 
  
22 https://www.elixir-europe.org/ 
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 Figure 3.5 ELIXIR components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by DARIAH, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.6 ELIXIR Authentication flow 
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 B.4 WLCG Federated Grid-Service Access 
WLCG is an infrastructure centred at CERN in which authentication is governed by the              23
ownership of personal X.509 certificates. A large number of WLCG Grid Services run on this               
infrastructure and rely on these certificates as well as authorisation roles defined in the VOMS               
service to validate users. There is currently no access to this infrastructure via eduGAIN. Moving               
away from X.509 certificates and towards federated login via SAML is a strategic decision. 
 
FTS (“File Transfer Service”) is a service for users to schedule file transfers. It is one of many                  
services that run on WLCG and was chosen for the initial pilot due to its suitability for                 
enhancement and appropriate level of complexity. The FTS service itself uses X.509 certificates             
(or proxies ) to transfer files from one endpoint to another and supports a range of endpoint                24
protocols used by grids and clouds, including GridFTP , WebDAV , and SRM . 25 26 27
 
WebFTS is a web (portal) front end to FTS, enabling users to easily register and monitor file                 
transfers. WebFTS, for the ATLAS VO, was chosen as a pilot. The user authenticates via               
eduGAIN to the CERN SSO (as a central proxy component). The portal then transforms the               
SAML token into a short lived X.509 credential via STS (Security Token Service) for the user. In                 
this pilot, participating sites had to trust the IOTA CA. 
  
23 http://wlcg.web.cern.ch/ 
24 ​http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt 
25 ​http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.47.pdf 
26 ​http://www.webdav.org/specs/ 
27 ​http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.129.pdf 
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Figure 3.7 WLCG-Federated Grid components mapped to color coded architectural functional           
components. The architectural drawing is provided by WLCG, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.8 WLCG Authentication flow 
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 B.5 Umbrella 
Umbrella is the AAI developed by PaNdata (Photon and Neutron Data Infrastructure) for the              
European Neutron and Photon community. 
Umbrella defines its own SAML-based federation. It is not associated with any national identity              
federation or eduGAIN. Umbrella provides one global, replicated IdP that provides a persistent             
and unique user identifier over the lifetime of a user. Users can sign up in a self-service fashion                  
for an account in this IdP. Authentication information is provided and updated by the users               
themselves (self assertion). The Umbrella account needs to be linked to a trusted one at each                
facility. This avoids central handling of a complex general model for trust relations and              
procedures between participating facilities (sites), but multiplies work for user ID vetting by             
delegating this to each facility. 
Due to the initial low level of assurance and due to the nature of workflows in the targeted                  
lightsource community (users travel to facilities), their identity has to be vetted upon initial visit at                
each facility, e.g. by providing a photo-ID for verification. Login to the Umbrella SP-IdP-proxy              
using a home identity is on their roadmap. 
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Figure 3.9 UMBRELLA components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by UMBRELLA, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.10 UMBRELLA Authentication flow 
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 B.6 INDIGO 
INDIGO-DataCloud is an EU project, started in April 2015 and will end in September 2017. The                
main objective is to develop an Open-Source platform for scientific computing and data storage,              
deployed on public and private cloud infrastructures. 
The INDIGO AAI is currently in its early implementation phase. It is going to be similar in design                  
to the EUDAT and ELIXIR AAIs in that it allows logins from home-IdPs and social IdPs (Google,                 
etc), and provides a proxy component. The difference however, is that credential translation             
occurs in two places. The first translation at the proxy always translates to OpenID-Connect              
(OIDC). An optional second translation occurs at each site that supports INDIGO services. That              
translation step can generate “whatever it takes” for a user to login. A user authenticated on a                 
higher level (e.g. INDIGO Login Service, ​proxy​ in the picture below) could for example request               
the creation of a user account together with a site-trusted proxy-certificate, and use these for               
native access to X.509 based services at that site. This way INDIGO will enable users to                
authenticate to existing, unmodified services. Client software will be developed to hide that             
complexity from the user. 
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Figure 3.11 INDIGO components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by INDIGO, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.12 INDIGO Authentication flow 
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 B.7 EGI-AAI Pilot 
The EGI AAI pilot aims to enable users to access EGI services using home IdP credentials via                 
eduGAIN. This e-Infrastructure pilot defines an SP-IdP-proxy that allows login from eduGAIN,            
social identity providers (e.g. google) or using an eGOV ID. The SP-IdP-proxy uses one or more                
attribute authorities to extend the available attributes, and uses a token translation service to              
generate X.509 certificates. These certificates can be used to authenticate at all services             
provided within the EGI infrastructure. 
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Figure 3.13 EGI components mapped to color coded architectural functional components. The            
architectural drawing is provided by EGI, the color coding by AARC 
 
Figure 3.14 EGI Authentication flow 
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